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Abstract 
 
The interplay between religious and political authorities has been commonplace and study 
subject of political science. The interplay between politics and economics has been 
commonplace too, and the focus of political economy. That is, politics emerges as the link 
between religious and economic matters. This paper tries to rationalize analytically this link 
between religion and resource allocation through the religion-public policy correlation. It is 
found out that such a correlation is welfare-enhancing unless fanaticism forces society to 
choose between Pareto efficiency under a fundamentalist minority dictatorial rule on the one 
hand, and the broader socioeconomic aspirations of the majority of people on the other. Yet, 
fundamentalism is expected to subside in the long-run to the extent fanaticism is the result of 
an emotional outburst. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Chaney (2013), and Grigoriadis and Torgler (2013) are two recent of the few attempts 
towards the empirical documentation of the hypothesis that religious leaders exert political 
power through religion-public policy correlation reflected in the resource allocation regime. 
This paper presents some theoretical arguments towards this direction. It is in general one 
more addition to this hypothesis as advanced lately by Israel (2006) and North, Wallis, and 
Weingast (2009). Israel relates characteristically the vigorousness of oppressive regimes with 
actions on the part of religious leadership, Grigoriadis and Torgler (p.1): “find strong support 
for the proposition that collectivist norms and an institutional religious identity enhance 
positive attitudes towards central government”, and Chaney confirms econometrically this 
nexus between religion and politico-economics, which this paper tries to tackle from various 
theoretical points of view.  
 
This is an extremely important issue if one also judges from the literature on the 
“doctrine of restraint” in a liberal democracy. This doctrine wants citizens to restrain 
themselves from approving or disapproving public policy solely upon religious reasons. The 
view of “full restrain”, i.e. no involvement of religion at all, as expressed e.g. by Rotry (1994) 
is overwhelmed by the view of “partial restrain” as is contemplated e.g. by Audi (2000) and 
according to which citizenry should support public policy when the secular and religion 
elements correlate, and might as well refrain from doing so in the absence of such correlation. 
And, there are also some, like e.g. Eberle (2002) and Perry (1994), who insist in the primacy 
of religion in shaping policy.  
 
The point is that all, from Adam Smith (1904 [1776]) to Iannaccone (2012), agree in 
that the marriage of religion with politics can be optimal from the religious standpoint, 
establishing a mutually beneficial channel between the cosmic-minded quests of religious 
authorities and political ambition on the part of politicians.
1
 And, all agree that religion is 
capable of shaping from national productivity and growth, (see e.g. Barro and McCleary, 
2003; Gruber, 2005; Kuran, 2004; and Becker and Woessman, 2009), to international 
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economic and non-economic dynamics, (see e.g. Barro and McCleary, 2005; Gill, 2005; 
Iyigun, 2008; and McCleary and van der Kuijp, 2010). Indeed, worshipping attracts societal 
resources and affects incentives in the sphere of the economy depending on the resource 
allocation regime determined by the interaction of religious societies with the state.  
 
Overtly or covertly, the state does need the support of the dominant religion; and, 
overtly or covertly, that religion does constitute a public good in the eyes either of the state or 
of the majority of the citizenry. The question is how far the state and the public are willing 
and able to accommodate the public character and hence, provision of this good. The resource 
allocation regime is shaped by this reality. Three such benchmark regimes are advanced in the 
next section in an effort to investigate the subsequent socio-economic dynamics. These 
regimes are: the Secularist, the State-sponsored, and the Fundamentalist, depending on 
whether the religious good is privately financed under a Walrasian equilibrium without the 
slightest connection with public policy, publicly provided under a Nash but Pareto-inefficient 
equilibrium in compliance with the mandate for the correlation between religion and public 
policy, or over-produced anyhow under a Lindahl and Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the 
sense of full public policy subjugation to religion, respectively. 
 
2. The Analytical Framework 
 
The approach to the demand for religious services is usually based on the way the 
religious good should be entering the utility function and hence, on the definition of this 
good; see, for example, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975),  Iannaccone (1990), Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (2008), and Barro et al. (2010). Here, we take religious belief for granted, and we 
discuss the nexus between type of resource allocation regime and cosmic quests of 
priesthood. The definition of the religious good is always simple: places to pray, people who 
will guide the believer, and stuff for rituals. This is the reason that as we shall see below, the 
resource allocation regime does not make much difference in the volume of the resources 
allocated to religion. It does, however, make much difference in so far as it reflects the extent 
of the involvement of religious authorities in public affairs.  
 
2.1 Conventional Treatment 
 
For convenience, we assume that there are only two goods; the religious one, R, 
which is produced under a constant average and marginal cost, r, and the cosmic good, K, 
taken as the numeraire, of which individual i has endowment B i . Let both of them be private 
goods. Hence, each religious individual is called for to maximize utility:  
U i ( B i −rR i , R i ),  i=1,2,…,N 
with first-order condition:    
ii
ii
KU
RU
/
/
=r, Ni , 
implying that expenses for the religious good are as high as needed to equate the individual 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) with the marginal rate of transformation. The solution is 
illustrated diagrammatically through point S in Figure 1 where AZ represents the constraint 
K i =B i −rR i . S is the point of tangency of the highest possible indifference curve with the 
individual budget constraint, AZ, leading to OV=R
s
i
.  
 
Point S reflects the case of the Secularist provision of the religious good, defined to 
be the case of wholly privately financed religious commodity akin either to a closed sect, or to 
a private, inherited, non-proselytical religious environment within the context of a cultural 
mosaic, tolerant pluralism, rather than cultural melting pot, (Kelley and Trebilcock, 2010;  
Mearman, 2011), and without any involvement in public policy making. These two extremes 
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are identical economics-wise, because they both exhibit market-like behavior given in 
addition that free-riding against fellow believers is incompatible with believing. Regardless 
the would-be fanatical background of a sect, its members feel within its realm as free as the 
people of inherited religion. This is something that appears also to be confirmed by works 
such as those of Glaeser (2005), Iannaccone and Berman (2006), Benmelech and Berrebi 
(2007), and Iannaccone (2012), each from its own perspective.
2
  
 
To examine the case of public support in its provision, it is convenient to assume 
Cournot-like behavior in the sense that each individual takes for granted what the others 
would contribute towards the production of R regardless what s/he will chose to do. S/he is 
called for to maximize: 
U
i
( B
i
-rR
i
, R
i
+
ij
R ),  i j,  i,j=1,2,…,N, 
with the same first-order condition as above, and with MRS =Nr provided that all 
religious individuals are treated as identical. Point P in Figure 1 captures this Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, with DL=R
p
i
given iR , and with each point on SP associated with a sum over 
a different each time, ν, ν=1,2,…,N, summands. Point P describes the case of the State-
sponsored regime, which is the state-sponsored religious-authority religious good provision 
coming out of partial public policy-religion correlation as a means of (a) softening the private 
burden for  the production of the religious good, (b) stimulating at the same time the 
consumption and production of the private cosmic good, because R
p
i
< R
s
i
, and (c) 
strengthening potentially work incentives and growth as follows: One reason the reduction in 
religious expenditure may be individually and socially desirable, is just because the public 
production of the religious good can be cost-reducing through economies of scale. And, the 
other reason is that under a large N, the reduction would be very small: 
p
R = 
(N/N+1)
s
R  under linear demand functions. Now, combining the production cost 
reduction with the slight only expenditure reduction, a negligible only reduction in the 
provision of the religious good is expected. But, what is more important is that some partial 
religion-public policy correlation would be conducive to growth not so much from the 
viewpoint of increased resources allocated to religion, as because such a correlation might 
boost work incentives to work for “country and faith”. 
 
FIGURE 1: About here 
 
The economics for the negligible reduction in the provision of the religious good 
under such circumstances, comes about by abandoning for a moment the standard public 
finance framework followed so far; (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980), and entering 
standard microeconomics, (see e.g. Henderson and Quandt, 1980). Contrary to the case of 
private goods where production and consumption decision-making is made by two distinct 
types of agents, producers and consumers, respectively, such a decision-making is made in 
the case of public goods by a single type of agents, namely the voters. The consumers of a 
public good decide individually how much of it needs to be produced (a) given that it will be 
provided monopolistically (by the state-sponsored religious authority in our case here) under 
average cost pricing, (zero religious authority profits), and (b) given what the other 
consumers-voters would contribute towards the production of the good. Consequently, the 
decision-making problem of the voter becomes in its role as a producer identical to that of the 
Cournot oligopolist, and assuming next for simplicity constant average and marginal cost of 
production, the result in so far as our topic here is concerned, 
p
R = (N/N+1)
s
R , 
obtains.  
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What prompts this inequality of the R’s, is the Cournot response of individuals to the 
call for religion-public policy correlation; or the same, it is the economic side of a call for 
religious revival that would presumably enhance the cosmic status of clergy. For us here, it is 
only for this reason that R may be offered as a public good contrary to the usual modeling of 
R as a collective good provided by organized religion, and subject moreover to property rights 
enforcement, etc; (see e.g. Iannaccone, 1991; Chaves and Cann, 1992; Montgomery, 2003; 
and Froese and Pfaff, 2005). There can be no economics of religion if religion is not 
organized as such, because then only the part of rituals, private rituals, would remain from the 
definition of R, unworthy of special economic investigation. After all, as Durkheim (1965 
[1915], p.59) has put it: “[i]n all history we do not find a single religion without a Church”. 
And, moreover, it would be self-contradictory to maintain that a believer supports organized 
religion to cheat on it as perhaps s/he might do in the case of the non-religious public goods. 
Otherwise, such a believer would be irrational, and irrationality has no place in economics.  
 
To return back to our results, making a religion state-sponsored so to speak, ends in a 
reduced R, compensated presumably by the consolidation of a religious revival in the place of 
a simple inherited religious identity. Consequently, only a fanatic would raise the issue that 
there is a (1/N+1)
s
R missing from maximizing social welfare, because note that the 
institutionalization of a state religion does not preclude pluralism. It just turns it into a 
“selfish” one to confront perhaps a stronger, not necessarily religious, opponent united.  It 
does, however, lend itself to extremism, and adoption by the state of the extreme demand for 
(1/N+1)
s
R more R, would lead to the equilibrium given by point F, where AT is the line 
K=B−(rR)/N, and DQ=OV= R s
i
. F is a Lindahl equilibrium given our assumption about 
constant average and marginal cost in the supply of R. Average cost pricing is consistent with 
zero Church profits, balanced government budget, and Pareto-efficient resource allocation, 
matching in effect the Lindahl tax. But, F does not belong to the Cournot-Nash reaction 
curve, destabilizing the society and hence, undesirable by the majority of its members. This is 
the reason F can only be the outcome of subjugation to fanaticism and the case of the 
Fundamentalist regime, of perfect religion-public policy coordination.  
 
It is an environment of passionateness that might as well lead to over-production of R 
beyond that dictated by point F. But, even if not, the subsequent socioeconomic disorder will 
be having the tendency to restore equilibrium P if let by the fanatics ceteris paribus. The 
Pareto-inefficient P is the result of Nash democratic interaction whereas the Lindahl 
equilibrium F, which does reproduce the Pareto-efficiency of Walrasian S, is the outcome of 
minority veto; typical paradigm of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Nevertheless, the 
dynamics of socio-economic unrest may even lead to action against the authoritarianism of 
official religion and towards the decentralized Walras equilibrium under S per se in a quest 
for an economic efficiency and religious respect accompanied by democracy, too. Much more 
so when as Curini et al. (2014) document empirically, radicals feel “happier” than moderates, 
but less happy the closer they are to a government of theirs: Fanaticism is an unstable 
equilibrium. 
 
 
2.2 Treatment of Fanaticism 
 
Fanaticism is identified here with pressing quests for social welfare slightly only 
greater than that associated with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, P, i.e. with quests for any 
status quo to the right of P up to F along AT, since any of these points lies on an indifference 
curve which is higher than that which is tangent at P. The “keywords” behind the 
characterization “fanaticism” are “pressing” (quests) for “slightly greater” (benefits). Yet, 
such a behavior is not captured explicitly by our modeling, which is also true for the behavior 
aiming at just making a religion a state-sponsored one. The reason is the assumption of 
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identical individuals. And, although a quest to proclaim a religion a state-sponsored one may 
be unanimous on the part of its believers in line with this assumption, fanaticism cannot be 
unanimous at least in the context of this analytical framework. If it were, point F would not be 
unstable. Consequently, a differentiation of the utility functions is required to account for the 
effect of different religious militancy on resource allocation. 
 
Toward this end, a given amount of resources should be seen analytically as a 
heterogeneous, divisible good, consisting of one cosmic part and one religious part so that if 
one prefers K twice as much as R and another person has the opposite preference, a Pareto-
efficient, envy-free, and equitable allocation of the [(1/2)K, (1/2)R] resource would be to give 
(2/3)K+(1/3)R to the former person and the remaining (2/3)R+(1/3)K to the other person. 
Such an allocation would be (a) Pareto-efficient since there is no other allocation giving these 
two persons portions that they value at least as much as the ones allocated, (b) envy-free, 
because each person values its allocation at least as much as that of the other person, and (c) 
equitable given that each person values its allocation exactly the same as the other person 
values its own allocation. Yet, Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2006, 2012) have established that 
equitability and envy-freeness can be incompatible for three or more players with differing 
value functions regarding a heterogeneous resource. And, it is equally well known that 
distributive justice problems plague even Walrasian equilibrium per se; (Varian, 1974, 1975). 
This is exactly the analytical environment within which fanaticism may be captured 
explicitly. 
 
Consider the following example prompting a trade-off between envy-freeness and 
equitability even in a two player context, and giving rise to fanaticism under envy-freeness 
because of this precisely trade-off. Let the resource = iB  be defined by the [0,1]-
interval, (z, 1−z) be an allocation of it between R and K, and (x i , 1−x i ) be an allocation of B i  
such that ix =z and 1− ix =1−z. And, let moreover, i=2, with U 1 (x 1 , 1−x 1 ) =a1+R 1
2
 
and U 2 (x 2 , 1−x 2 ) =a 2 +R 2
2/3
. Presumably, a 1  and a 2  give the maximum utility derived 
when only K is consumed, (x i =0), and R comes to enhance this utility in a concave fashion 
but which differs between the two individuals. Equating the two utilities to find the envy-free 
allocation, and letting R 2 =bR 1 , 0<b 1 , and a1−a 2 =a, yields for solution equation, 
R 1
2
− R 2
2/3
= a 1− a 2 =a => R 1
2
−b
2/3
 R 1
2/3
=a=> R1
2/3
(R 1
2/1
−b
~
)−a=0, where b
~
= 
b
2/3
. If instead of R 1
2/1
 we had y, this equation would be the cubic one, y
2
(y−b
~
)-a=0 or 
y
3
−b
~
y
2
−a=0. The solution to this equation derives from the discussion of its discriminant, 
which is made in the Appendix and which leads to the considerations illustrated through 
Figure 2. 
 
                                                            FIGURE 2: About here 
 
The utility curve of individual 2 is flatter than that of individual 1, reflecting the fact 
that a 2 >a 1  implies that a given K confers to the former more utility than to the latter 
individual, and hence, that 2 is less religious-prone than 1. U1  increases all the way up to 
s
R and may peak even further after 
s
R  whereas the U 2  curve peaks at 
p
R <
s
R ; 
(presumably, 
s
R  and 
p
R  correspond to R
s
i
 and R
p
i
, respectively). At 
s
R , there is envy-
freeness and Pareto efficiency but equitability is given by 
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w
0
(a 1+R
2
)dR=
1
w
( a 2 +R
2/3
)dR => w
3
−(6/5)w
2/5
+3aw+3(a 2 +2)=0,  
whose solution differs from that of the above cubic equation, because presumably the two 
equations are not identical. One of the two individuals or both of them do not see the solution 
b=[(27/4)a]
9/3
 as being an equitable one. Under a Walrasian equilibrium, only one of them 
will be complaining, namely individual 1, because U 2  peaks after 
s
R . S/he will continue 
complaining under a Lindahl equilibrium for the same precisely reason, but now the other 
individual will start complaining too, for having to consume involuntarily 
s
R as opposed to 
p
R  which is what s/he wants if R is not provided through the market. The only explanation 
why individual 2 would conform voluntarily with 
s
R in the latter case is a “keep up with the 
Jones” attitude, with the “Jones” being the religious-prone individual 1, her or his “holiness” 
which has not been given the chance yet to turn into fanaticism.  
 
It seems that we have now a clearer picture about fanaticism. A fanatic’s U curve is 
one which peaks after the Walrasian equilibrium, and the quest for the movement to the 
Lindahl equilibrium after a religion has become state-sponsored, is used only as a first step 
toward eventually the consumption of R>
s
R in line with the fanatic’s aspirations. This 
appears to be the reason why a fanatic would make so much noise about such a negligible 
lack in the consumption of R by his/her coreligionist as that implied by the b=[(27/4)a]
9/3
. 
Managing to impose this marginal increase of R on society opens the road to theocracy which 
is actually the ultimate target of the fanatic. To see these considerations from still another 
perspective, 
p
R  might be seen as the outcome of majority voting under median voter theory 
whereas the Lindahl 
s
R   is an intermediate step toward the despotic enforcement of the peak 
of the utility curve of the fanatic, acting as an interest group of increasing militancy, (Black, 
1948; Downs, 1957). 
 
It is important to emphasize the coercive character of the Lindahl equilibrium once it 
is recognized that the authority that has been formed to produce a public good has been 
formed not only for this reason per se, but also for the reason(s) that induced the public to 
demand the provision of the particular public good in the first place. These are reasons which 
are as a rule politicized. From this point of view, there will always be some part of the public 
stressing the political rather than the economic role of the state, and trying to subdue the 
economic to the political element by turning Walrasian to Lindhal if not to Lange-Lerner and 
even distortive Kantorovich equilibria.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The analytical framework advanced herein might certainly become more elaborate 
and the subsequent game-theoretic interaction explicit. But, it would be superfluous to 
proceed to such a detailed discussion given Occam’s razor in trying to explain phenomena: A 
specification of the utility functions would be needed at considerable loss of generality, with a 
marginal only benefit in terms of formality.  
 
Judging the conclusions reached earlier from still another viewpoint, namely that of 
economic-cum-emotional (EE) rationality as advanced by Parada-Daza (2004) and Parada-
Daza and Parada-Contzen (2013) through emotional well-being utility functions, the fact 
remains that: Agents, who are not willing to compromise some level of economic satisfaction, 
coexist with other agents, who are not willing to compromise non-economic utility indices, 
and the societal outcome is susceptible to the correlation between the non-economic element 
and public policy. Yet, to the extent fanaticism is the outcome of emotional outburst, it and 
thereby fundamentalism may very well be suboptimal from the viewpoint of EE rationality in 
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the long-run. As such fanaticism may be seen as a temporary more or less deviation away 
from Cournot optimality. 
 
In so far as religion is concerned, it is natural then but cosmically rather than 
spiritually motivated that if a religious authority wants to be having a say on societal matters 
on behalf of its followers, it will have to be doing so by advancing cosmic claims. And, 
history is there to see that if this is not done as efficiently as it should according to some 
believers, doctrinal innovation or heresy, motivated primarily by cosmic claims, and dressed 
with some theology, canon law, and rituals, will be in order.
3
 It is this, broadly recognized, as 
was explained in the introductory section, issue that this paper tried to rationalize 
theoretically.  
 
Actually, this paper might as well be titled “The Simple Analytics of Dogmatic 
Imperialism”, be it religious or not, and including inter alia in the list of historical incidents, 
Fascism-Nazism and Marxism-Leninism, too. But, we think that humanity is nowadays at a 
stage of development under which although religion or ideology has not been taken away 
from man’s life, development has made it a personal only affair as a modus vivendi, without 
raising any institutionalization issues regarding the religious or party organization with which 
the personal belief is connected: According to the 2012 WIN-Gallup International Global 
Index of Religiosity and Atheism, a global average of 59% declares to be a religious person, 
ranging from 96% in Ghana to 14% in China, and from 97% for Buddhists to 38% for Jewish. 
The question posed to respondents was: Irrespective of whether you attend a place of worship 
or not, would you say you are a religious person, not a religious person or a convinced 
atheist?... 
 
Appendix 
 
The discriminant Δ of the cubic equation y
3
−b
~
y
2
−a=0 is Δ=−(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
) and appears at 
first sight to be negative even if a<0=>a1<a 2 , since absolutely 27a
2
>4b
~ 3
a=>(27/4)a>b
~ 3
, 
which is true given that b is a decimal number raised totally to the power of 9/2. Hence, our 
equation appears to have only one real root: 
y 1 =
3
~
b
−
3
1
{
2
1
[−2
3~
b −27a+ )27
~
4(27
23
aab ]}
3/1
 
−
3
1
{
2
1
[−2
3~
b −27a− )27
~
4(27
23
aab ]}
3/1
. 
But, note from the second cubic root that unless not only −(2b
~ 3
+27a)>0=> 
−(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)>0, but also (2 b
~ 3
+27a)> )27
~
4(27
23
aab => 
(2b
~ 3
+27a)
2
>27(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)=>(2b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)
2
>27(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
) or 
(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)
2
>27(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)=>(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)>27, the solution y 1  will not be a real 
number and hence, Δ cannot be negative. At the other end, we cannot assume that Δ>0, not 
only because it would imply that (27/4)a<b
~ 3
, which is counterintuitive. The only option left 
is that Δ=0, with our cubic equation having a multiple real root. But, 
Δ=0=>−(4b
~ 3
a+27a
2
)=0=>4b
~ 3
+27a=0, which is sensible only if we can write 4b
~ 3
=27a, 
thus implying that a 1 -a 2 <0=> a 1 <a 2  and b
~ 3
=(27/4)a.   
 
Notes 
 
1. “But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of the 
clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to those effects. 
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Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political 
faction. Upon such occasions, each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for its 
interest to league itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But this 
could be done only by adopting, or at least by favouring, the tenets of that particular sect. The 
sect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party necessarily shared in 
the victory of its ally, by whose favour and protection it was soon enabled in some degree to 
silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves 
with the enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The 
clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete masters of the field, and their 
influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they 
were powerful enough to over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the 
civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally 
that he should silence and subdue their adversaries: and their second, that he should bestow an 
independent provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the 
victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil.” Wealth of 
Nations, 1776, V.I.196. 
 
2. This is what more or less Adam Smith may mean when he states that: “It may naturally be 
thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics belong to the first class, and that their 
encouragement, as well as that of lawyers and physicians, may safely be entrusted to the 
liberality of individuals, who are attached to their doctrines, and who find benefit or 
consolation from their spiritual ministry and assistance. Their industry and vigilance will, no 
doubt, be whetted by such an additional motive; and their skill in the profession, as well as 
their address in governing the minds of the people, must receive daily increase from their 
increasing practice, study, and attention.” Wealth of Nations, 1776, V.1.194. 
 
3. See note 1. 
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